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Abstract 
We investigate a new data set on the maturity of bank credit to the private sector in 74 
countries. We show that credit maturity is longer in countries with strong institutions, low 
inflation, large financial markets, and where banks share information about borrowers. 
Furthermore, we extend the finance and growth literature by showing that credit maturity 
matters for economic growth. Economic growth is enhanced in countries where agents 
have access to long-term financing. Therefore, weak institutions, high inflation and other 
variables that reduce credit maturity have an impact on economic growth via their 
influence on credit maturity. The estimated effects are substantial in size.  
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The Maturity Structure of Bank Credit:  
Determinants and Effects on Economic Growth 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature on financial development and economic growth has established that 
finance has a positive, statistically significant, and economically large causal effect on 
economic growth (Levine 2005). There is, however, much less empirical evidence on the 
channels through which this positive effect is obtained. Levine (2005) points out that 
even “the organization of the empirical evidence advertises an important weakness in the 
finance and growth literature: there is frequently an insufficiently precise link between 
theory and measurement. Theory focuses on particular functions provided by the 
financial sector, [while the empirical literature] pertains to the proxies for financial 
development.” 
Transforming liquid savings into illiquid assets that can fund long-term 
investment projects is one of the important functions of the financial system. Levine 
(1997) explains that economic growth is closely linked to the maturity transformation 
function of the financial system, as high-return projects require a long commitment of 
capital but savers do not like to relinquish control of their savings for long periods. The 
financial system plays a key role in preserving the liquidity of savings of individual 
savers while investing a portion of the funds into illiquid long-term projects. Historical 
evidence supports this claim. According to Hicks (1969), the capital market 
improvements that mitigated liquidity risks were the primary cause of England’s 
industrial revolution as individual investors could hold liquid assets but at the same time 
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the financial system transformed these liquid financial instruments into long-term capital 
investments. As England’s industrial revolution required large commitments of capital 
for long periods, Levine (1997) goes as far as noting that the industrial revolution may 
not have occurred without this liquidity transformation. 
Our objective is to provide empirical evidence for that function of the financial 
system. For that purpose we collect and analyze a unique data set on the maturity of 
domestic bank credit to the private sector in 74 countries during the period from about 
1990 to 2005. We ask two broad questions. First, what factors determine the differences 
in credit maturity across countries? For example, only 24 percent of domestic private 
credit in Mali has maturity longer than 1 year, whereas in Hungary 75 percent of credit 
has maturity longer than 1 year. What explains that difference? Second, we investigate 
whether credit maturity has an effect on economic growth.   
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) develop an insightful model that formalizes the 
relationship between the maturity transformation role of banks and economic growth. 
There are two savings assets in the model: a liquid asset that matures early but returns 
less of the consumption good and an illiquid asset that has a higher (but later) payoff.1 If 
liquidated before it matures, the illiquid asset returns less than the liquid asset. Following 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), individuals are uncertain about their future liquidity needs 
at the time they make capital allocation decisions and therefore they invest most of their 
savings into the liquid low-return asset. Financial institutions emerge as groups of 
individuals who pool their savings, keep a portion of the pooled savings in liquid assets to 
meet the liquidity needs of their members, and invest the remaining amount in illiquid 
                                                 
1 The higher return on the illiquid asset captures the idea of the slow production cycle of high productivity 
investments, as well as the long gestation periods in capital production as discussed by Böhm-Bawerk  
(1891), Cameron (1967), and Kydland and Prescott (1982). 
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high-return project. By the law of large numbers, financial institutions can predict the 
aggregate demand for liquidity across their members and, therefore, they invest a smaller 
fraction of the savings in the liquid asset compared to the individual investors. As a 
result, the proportion of society’s savings that are invested in projects with high 
productivity increases and this enhances economic growth.  
In Bencivenga and Smith, economic growth increases in the proportion of savings 
invested in long-term assets.2  We provide empirical evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. We show that, holding constant the level of credit, longer credit maturity 
enhances economic growth. Our empirical evidence fits well with papers showing that 
the effect of finance on growth depends on the economic and institutional environment of 
a country. For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Choi, Smith, and Boyd (1996), 
Haslag and Koo (1999), Khan and Senhadji (2000), and Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) 
show that the effect of credit on growth is diminished in high inflation countries. It is, 
however, not clear what function of the financial system is blocked in high inflation 
environments. Our results suggest that credit has a smaller effect on growth (at least 
partly) because the financial system shifts resources toward short-term, less productive 
assets. 
Before we present that evidence and in order to become more familiar with credit 
maturity, we investigate its determinants by testing a number of empirical hypotheses 
                                                 
2 The notion that long-term lending enhances growth is not universally accepted. Sissoko (2006) combines 
the monetary and the financial role of intermediaries into a growth model where agents can buy and sell a 
cash-in-advance constraint. This gives rise to growth enhancing short-term credit, but the author does not 
test this prediction for lack of data on credit maturity. Also, in Flannery (1986) firms that are not concerned 
about reevaluation by the credit markets (good firms) will borrow short-term, while firms that fear 
reevaluation (bad firms) will want to borrow long-term. Therefore, short-term credit could have a positive 
effect on growth as more short-term credit implies more efficient investments. However, the more realistic 
setting of Titman (1992) with uncertain interest rate and financial distress costs motivates good firms to use 
long-term credit despite the lower contractual cost on short-term debt. Diamond (1991) also shows that 
good firms borrow short- and long-term to extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity risk. 
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drawn from the literature. The data show that credit maturity varies substantially across 
countries, even if the countries have a similar level of financial and economic 
development. We show that credit maturity is shorter in countries with lax rule of law, 
high inflation, less developed financial markets, and greater economic volatility.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We describe the data in the 
following section. Section 3 draws empirical hypotheses from the literature and 
investigates the determinants of credit maturity. Section 4 present results for the effect of 
credit maturity on economic growth and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data on credit maturity 
We use data on lending by banks to the private sector in 74 countries spanning the 
period from about 1990 to 2005, depending on data availability for the individual 
countries. The data were collected from a variety of sources including publications by 
central banks and multilateral organizations. Table 1 provides variable definitions and 
details the sources of the data. The sample includes all countries for which we could 
identify a consistent data source. The summary statistics of our private credit variable, 
shown in Table 2, match closely those from the widely used World Bank data set on 
financial structure (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000) for the entire sample and 
for each individual country. However, because our sample spans only more recent years, 
the summary statistics reveal a higher level of financial development compared to the 
World Bank data that begin in 1960.   
Credit is decomposed into two categories: short-term credit that has contractual 
maturity of one year or less and long-term credit that has contractual maturity longer than 
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one year. Some countries, most notably many of the transition economies, provide more 
detailed data on credit maturity – up to one year, one to five years and longer than 5 
years. Some countries report maturity longer than 7 or even 15 years. While it would be 
interesting to investigate credit with different maturity structures (e.g. medium-term, 
long-term, and “very long-term” credit), the only categorization that is consistent across 
all countries is the one that divides credit into short-term credit with maturity of one year 
or less and other credits. Therefore, we proceed with this definition of short-term and 
long-term debt but we also explore other maturity structures in a parallel paper with a 
smaller sample.3     
Table 3 shows large differences in terms of financial development measured as 
private credit as percent of GDP. For example, in Albania, Azerbaijan, Chad and several 
other countries, private credit is below 10 percent of GDP whereas in Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Taiwan and several other countries it is well over 100 percent of 
GDP. Table 4, which reports the credit averages for three groups of countries based on 
income, shows that private bank credit has the lowest level in low income countries 
(25.01 percent of GDP), compared to middle income countries (58.31 percent of GDP) 
and high income countries (93.81 percent of GDP).  
On average, 54.14 percent of bank credit to the private sector has long-term 
maturity. There are, however, large differences between countries. Long-term credit is 
less than 30 percent of total credit in a number of countries including Bangladesh, The 
Central African Republic, Niger, and Lesotho and it is greater than 70 percent of total 
                                                 
3 The data do not indicate what portion of short-term credit is rolled over and used to finance long-term 
projects. Therefore, in some countries our measure of long-term credit is most likely an underestimate of 
the actual amount of funding available for long-term financing. While this introduces a measurement error, 
it also serves to produce more conservative estimates of a possible positive effect of credit maturity on 
economic growth.   
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credit in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, and several other countries. Table 4 shows 
that there are systematic differences in credit maturity between countries at different 
levels of economic and financial development. In low income countries, the percent long-
term credit is 40.38 percent, whereas in middle income and high income countries it is, 
respectively, 63.17 percent and 72.39 percent. More developed economies have more 
private credit and, also, a greater portion of their credits have long-term maturity. 
However, notice in Table 2 that the correlation coefficient of the level of credit and credit 
maturity is not very large in magnitude (0.57), i.e. credit maturity differs across countries 
with similar levels of credit to GDP. For example, credit is 95 percent of GDP in 
Germany and Belgium. However, the percent long-term credit is 83 percent in Germany 
and 66 percent in Belgium. Also, private credit is 40 percent of GDP in both Bangladesh 
and Estonia. However, in Estonia long-term credit is 83 percent of total credit and in 
Bangladesh it is only 14 percent of total credit.       
  
3. The determinants of credit maturity 
Building on Modigliani and Miller (1958), Stiglitz (1974) shows that in a perfect 
world the maturity of credit, as any other financing decision, is irrelevant. Subsequent 
research has added transaction costs, informational asymmetries, liquidation costs, and 
taxes to that framework as a result of which maturity becomes an important factor in 
financing decisions. There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of credit 
maturity from individual (mostly industrialized) countries reviewed by Ravid (1996).  
In terms of cross country evidence, Qian and Strahan (2007) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999) investigate the determinants of credit maturity in samples of, 
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respectively, 43 and 30 countries with a particular focus on the effect of legal institutions. 
We stay close to their analysis in terms of the selection of the country-level explanatory 
variables but we expand the number of countries substantially and we also include 
additional explanatory variables such as economic volatility and banking system 
concentration.  Furthermore, we use the maturity of bank credit to the entire private 
sector whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007) 
analyze the borrowing by publicly traded companies only. Using the total private bank 
credit allows us to link the paper to the finance and growth literature where that variable 
is used extensively.   
 
3.1. Empirical hypotheses 
Legal Institutions. The literature provides substantial evidence that weak legal 
institutions are a primary reason for the underdevelopment of financial markets as lenders 
cannot effectively monitor and exert control over borrowers (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998). 
Inefficient protection of creditor rights leads to a reduction in the volume of external 
financing provided by financial institutions to the private sector. Furthermore, institutions 
affect the terms of credits and the maturity of credit in particular. Diamond (1991; 1993) 
and Rajan (1992) show that short-term lending facilitates the enforcement of credit 
contracts as it limits the period during which an opportunistic firm can exploit its 
creditors without being in default. Diamond (2004) argues that “maturity acts as a 
substitute contracting tool to control borrower risk,” and that bank loan maturity is 
“especially sensitive to the legal environment.”  Giannetti (2003) also argues that if the 
law does not guarantee creditor rights, lenders would prefer short-term debt to control 
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entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior by using the threat of not renewing their loans. In 
line with these theories, we expect to find that weak institutions contribute to shorter 
maturity.  
High Inflation. Similar to weak legal institutions, high inflation is detrimental to 
the development of the financial system as it limits the amount of external financing 
available to borrowers (Huybens and Smith 1998, 1999). Furthermore, similar to legal 
institutions, high inflation affects credit maturity. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) point 
out that financial intermediaries are less willing to engage in long-run financial 
commitments in high inflation environments. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) also argue 
that high inflation will “discourage any long term financial contracting and financial 
intermediaries will tend to maintain very liquid portfolios. In this inflationary 
environment intermediaries will be less eager to provide long-term financing for capital 
formation and growth.” Therefore, we expect that high inflation reduces the fraction of 
credits with long-term maturity.  
Stock Market Development. Stock market development has an ambiguous effect 
on credit maturity. According to one view, a well functioning stock market could be a 
substitute source of long-term financing and would therefore reduce the demand for long-
term bank financing. Diamond (1997) argues that increased participation in markets 
causes the banking sector to shrink, primarily through reduced holdings of long-term 
assets. An alternative view holds that a developed stock market increases the ability of 
firms to obtain long-term financing as it helps reveal information about the borrowers and 
reduces information asymmetries (Grossman 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). 
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Therefore, theoretically the effect of stock market development on long-term bank 
financing is ambiguous. 
Banking Sector Competition. Banking sector competition can have a dual effect 
on the provision of external financing and the provision of long-term financing in 
particular. A high level of concentration in the banking sector may raise the cost of funds 
and thus reduce external financing (Pagano 1993). Alternatively, high concentration in 
the banking industry may foster close relationships between banks and borrowers which 
reduces information asymmetries and the cost of monitoring borrowers (Mayer 1988; 
Mayer and Hubbard 1990; Petersen and Rajan 1995). Therefore, the theoretical effect of 
banking system concentration on debt maturity is ambiguous.4 Testing the bank-firm 
relationship hypothesis Giannetti (2003) finds that, contrary to (her) expectations, 
maturity is shorter in countries where the banking system is more concentrated.  
Overall Level of Bank Credit. Diamond (1984) highlights the function of banks as 
delegated monitors that emerge to reduce the cost of monitoring borrowers by exploiting 
economies of scale. In the absence of banks, individual savers would incur the cost of 
assessing and monitoring investment projects. With economies of scale, a larger banking 
system would have lower monitoring costs, which reduces lending risk and increases the 
supply of long-term debt. There is, however, an additional effect related to the volume of 
credit extended in an economy. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that a larger pool of 
smaller, riskier, and less collateralized borrowers would obtain access to external 
financing with the expansion of the financial system. As most of the credits to these 
riskier borrowers are short-term, the proportion of short-term debt in total debt would 
                                                 
4 Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) investigate whether the market structure of the banking sector has empirical 
relevance for economic growth, finding that banking system concentration has a non-trivial impact on 
growth, but that competition in banking does not necessarily dominate monopoly and vice versa. 
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increase as overall lending increases. Thus, the theoretical effect of credit levels of credit 
maturity is ambiguous.  
Real Per Capita GDP. Ravid (1996) points to the “industry paradigm” of 
matching maturities introduced by Morris (1976) where a firm with long-term assets 
should use long-term debt. If the maturity of debt is longer than the asset life, the 
borrower might have a problem finding new assets to invest in but will have to continue 
servicing the debt. If debt maturity is shorter than the asset life, then the borrower is 
exposed to the risk of being short on cash when debt payments are due. Stohs and Mauer 
(1996) find evidence for this on the firm level. We use per capita GDP to proxy for the 
amount of fixed assets in a country, with richer countries having a larger stock of long-
term assets. Thus, higher GDP per capita is expected to be associated with longer debt 
maturity.  
Credit Information Sharing. Empirical researchers have shown that countries with 
institutions that gather and share information about borrowers have higher private credit 
to GDP ratios (Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2007; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; 
Jappelli and Pagano 2002).5 Furthermore, because lack of information reduces the supply 
of long-term credit (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007), information sharing is also 
expected to lengthen debt maturity. Zhang and Sorge (2007) provide a direct link 
between credit information sharing and credit maturity in a model where information 
sharing is used by banks as a screening device and leads to an equilibrium where short-
term contracts are not preferred. Empirically, Zhang and Sorge (2007) confirm their main 
                                                 
5 Information sharing overcomes adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and moral hazard problems 
(Padilla and Pagano 2000) in the credit markets. While, theoretically, the impact of information sharing on 
aggregate lending is ambiguous, the increase in lending to safe borrowers is certain. 
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hypothesis using data from publicly traded companies to show that information sharing 
leads to longer credit maturity. We expect to find the same effect.  
Real Per Capita GDP Growth. Smith and Watts (1992) note that GDP growth 
rates can serve as a proxy for investment opportunities: the demand for external financing 
would increase in boom times and will recede in recession periods. It is not clear, 
however, whether expansions would stimulate the demand for long-term and short-term 
credit in different ways. Nonetheless, we follow the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Qian and Strahan 2007) and include the growth rate of per capita GDP 
in our estimations.  
Output Volatility. Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) look at the 
variability of the return-on-assets to proxy for business risk expecting that an increase in 
variability would shorten the maturity of credit as it proxies for the short-term operational 
component of business risk. Giannetti (2003) notes that controlling for such risk has been 
neglected in the previous cross-country research, at least partly because of lack of 
suitable empirical proxies. The author uses a similar variable, but at the sectoral level, 
and shows that the percent short-term debt increases with higher volatility of the return-
on-assets of the corresponding sector in that country. It is more difficult to account for 
such risks at the country level. Nevertheless, if per capita GDP growth is a suitable proxy 
for investment opportunities as noted in the previous literature, then its variability can be 
used as a measure of business risk.6 
Manufacturing Share of Output. Barclay and Smith (1995) and Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001) show that the maturity of credit differs substantially across economic 
                                                 
6 In the context of international lending, Valev (2007) relies on the same proxy and shows that higher 
volatility of per capita GDP growth in a country leads U.S. banks to shorten the maturity of credit to that 
country. 
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sectors with manufacturing firms having a larger fraction of long-term credit as percent 
of their overall credit. We include the percent of manufacturing in total output as a proxy 
for the importance of the manufacturing sector on the country level. We expect that credit 
in countries with a larger manufacturing sector will have longer maturity.   
In summary, the empirical hypotheses drawn from the literature are as follows: 
.
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 Some of the explanatory variables: legal institutions, inflation, banking sector 
competition, financial development, and credit information sharing affect the availability 
of long-term financing primarily through the supply side. Other variables: stock market 
development, per capita GDP, economic growth, and the share of manufacturing affect 
the maturity of credit primarily through the demand side.     
The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 show that inflation and output volatility are 
negatively and significantly correlated with the percent long-term credit. Also, rule of 
law, credit information sharing, and GDP per capita are positively and significantly 
correlated with the percent long-term credit. The correlation between economic growth 
and the percent long-term credit is positive and significant as is the correlation between 
the credit level and the percent long-term credit. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
By construction private credit and the percent long-term credit are determined 
jointly and, therefore, we need to control for the endogeneity of private credit. Following 
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the literature, we could use countries’ legal origins as external instruments for the level of 
credit. However, for those to be valid instruments, we would have to assume that legal 
origin does not have an impact on credit maturity, except through its effect on credit. This 
may not be the case as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan 
(2007) find that legal origin has a direct influence on credit maturity. In addition, we 
would be constrained to using a random effects model (since the legal origin does not 
change over time) even though the Hausman test reveals that the explanatory variables 
used in the random-effects model are correlated with the country specific effects and, 
therefore, we have to use a fixed-effects estimation. To resolve these problems, we 
implement the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator that corrects for correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the country-level random-effects, and does not require the use 
of outside instruments.7 
When explaining the percent long-term credit one concern that arises is that the 
dependent variable is a ratio (between 0 and 100 percent) making OLS problematic as the 
predicted values might lay outside the unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). This 
may require the transformation of the dependent variable using a log-odds transformation 
(log(y/1−y)). However, the coefficient estimates using the log-odds ratio are difficult to 
interpret in a panel setting and therefore we follow the previous literature (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Valev 2006; 2007) and do not 
perform the transformation. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of the predicted values from 
the models are outside the unit interval.   
                                                 
7 For robustness, Appendix B presents a set of empirical results where we use a random-effects estimator, a 
fixed-effects estimator, GLS estimators that control for a heteroskedastic error structure and allow for 
AR(1) autocorrelation, as well as a two-stage least squares random-effects estimator. The estimated effects 
are similar across the various estimations.  
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3.3. Results 
Table 5 presents the empirical results regarding the determinants of credit 
maturity. We start with a benchmark equation where the percent long-term debt is 
explained by rule of law, inflation, financial and economic development, and economic 
growth. Then we add, one at a time, a dummy variable for credit information sharing, 
banking system concentration, stock market development measured by the stock market 
turnover ratio, output volatility, and the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP. In 
column (7) we report the estimations from a regression where we include all explanatory 
variables.  
It is immediately clear that the rule of law has a statistically significant and robust 
effect on the maturity of credit. Greater rule of law is associated with longer debt 
maturity. Looking at the estimations from the benchmark equation, a decrease in the rule 
of law by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of the percent long-term credit by 
5.57 percentage points (1.05*5.308). This result compares well with previous findings. In 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), a decrease of the Law & Order index by 1.05 
index points decreases the percent long-term debt by 5.78 percentage points.8 To 
illustrate, if the Slovak Republic (where the rule of law index is 0.288) had the rule of 
law level of Austria (1.891), its long-term credit would increase by 8.51 percentage 
points.  
                                                 
8 Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) use a different index to measure rule of law but their index has a 
nearly identical definition to ours (“the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing 
legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts”). In addition, their index has a similar standard 
deviation (1.597) and a similar range (4.286).  
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Inflation also affects credit maturity in significant ways with higher inflation 
leading to shorter credit maturity in all specifications. We explore the size of the effect of 
inflation in more detail later. Countries with deeper financial markets have a greater 
fraction of long-term credits. The estimates from the benchmark equation in column (1) 
suggest that if Slovakia (where private credit is 25.67 percent of GDP) had the level of 
private credit of Hungary (72.22 percent), it would also have 11.38 percentage points 
greater percent long-term credit. Thus, the process of financial deepening is accompanied 
by lengthening of the maturity of credit as suggested by Diamond (1984). 
To test whether information sharing affects credit maturity, we follow Qian and 
Strahan (2007) and include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country had either a 
public credit registry or a private credit bureau in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. 
Credit information sharing is statistically significant when included in the base estimation 
model and in the full model. The more conservative yet statistically significant estimate 
in column (7)  suggests that if Luxembourg had established a credit information sharing 
institution, the percent long-term credit would increase from 59.72 percent to 66.30 
percent, bringing it to the same percentage long-term credit as in Belgium. Using the 
same estimate, if China had not established a credit information sharing institution in 
2003, the average percent long-term credit would have remained at 29.48 percent, a level 
below Congo or Burkina. Instead, the percent long-term credit in China increased to 
36.24 percent.  
China is not the only country that established a credit information sharing 
institution during the years covered by our data – Norway implemented one in 1998, 
Bulgaria in 1999, and Romania in 2000, to name a few. Figure 1 shows that, perhaps not 
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coincidentally, the percent long-term credit increased in all countries that implemented a 
credit information sharing institution (except Serbia, where the implementation was 
preceded by macroeconomic and political turmoil and coincided with financial 
liberalization, closure of major banks, and overall reduction in credit). This was 
particularly true in countries that started at a relatively low percent of long-term credit. 
For example, the percent long-term credit in Romania doubled after the introduction of a 
public credit registry. 
Economic development measured by per capita GDP, which was included to 
proxy for the importance of long-term capital and to test the hypothesis of maturity 
matching is not statistically significant. This result differs from Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) who find evidence for maturity matching on the firm level. The 
difference in results may be attributed to the imprecise measure of fixed assets that we 
employ compared to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic who use a direct measure of fixed 
assets as a share of total assets.9 Similar to us, Qian and Strahan (2007) use per capita 
GDP to control for economic development and report an insignificant impact on maturity. 
GDP growth has mostly a positive coefficient, which implies that faster growing 
countries have more long-term credit. However, the coefficient is significant at the 
accepted confidence levels only when we control for the manufacturing share of output in 
column (6) and therefore we refrain from making stronger claims. Nevertheless, with the 
results on inflation, we interpret this finding in line with Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
                                                 
9 For robustness, we also tried to compile data on per capita capital stock and capital stock as share of GDP 
to proxy for the fixed assets in a country. However, the initial income and investment data needed to 
compute the capital stock are available only for a limited number of countries in our sample and are not 
available for the last few years of the sample period.  
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Maksimovic (2001): agents can borrow to invest in more productive, longer gestation 
projects against real, but not against inflationary growth prospects.  
The rest of the results suggest that banking industry concentration, stock market 
development, and output volatility do not affects bank credit maturity. Contrary to 
expectations, a greater share of manufacturing is associated with less long-term credit. 
Unfortunately data limitations prevent us from investigating whether this effect is driven 
by particular non-manufacturing sectors, e.g. utilities, transportation, and/or construction.  
 
3.4. Inflation and Credit Maturity 
To examine further the relationship between inflation and credit maturity, we 
reestimated the regression reported in column (7) using 40 subsamples ordered by the 
rate of inflation as in Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001). 
Both papers investigate the effect of inflation on financial sector activity and not on the 
maturity of credit specifically. However, the authors explain that the effect of financial 
development on economic growth diminishes with inflation because high inflation limits 
long-term financial contracting. Here we provide direct evidence for that idea.  
Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) find that inflation reduces the availability of bank 
credit at low inflation rates but after some threshold (which they estimate to be around 16 
percent) the negative effect of additional inflation on credit activity disappears. Similarly, 
Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that, while there is a statistically significant 
and economically important negative relationship between inflation and banking sector 
development, the marginal impact of inflation on bank lending activity diminishes 
rapidly. The threshold inflation rate above which inflation has no effect on credit market 
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activity in Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) is very close to that in Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2002): 15 percent. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that until this threshold is 
reached “the damage to the financial system has already been done, [and] further 
increases in inflation will have no additional consequences for financial sector 
performance or economic growth.” This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence from 
Brazil provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) who explain that an 
inflationary environment gives rise to the indexation of financial contracts reducing the 
negative impact of additional high inflation on credit markets.  
To examine these ideas using our data set, we sorted all observations according to 
the rate of inflation and estimated repeatedly the full model from column (7) in Table 5 
starting with observations 1 through 244, then on 2 through 245, continuing until the last 
subsample that includes observations 40 through 284.10 The estimated coefficients of 
inflation, along with the 95 percent confidence intervals, are plotted in Figure 2. Looking 
at Figure 2, we can identify three regions in terms of the effect of inflation on the percent 
long-term credit. Inflation significantly reduces the percent long-term credit until 
inflation reaches about 14 percent. After that point, the effect of inflation on the percent 
long-term credit declines markedly. When the inflation rate reaches about 25 percent, the 
negative effect of inflation on credit maturity increases again.  
The low range of inflation until about 14 percentage points is very close to the 
ranges reported by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001). 
However, our estimations suggest that the negative effect of high inflation reappears at 
                                                 
10 We need a large enough number of subsamples so that we can observe the variation of the inflation 
coefficient estimate at different levels of inflation. However, we also need to have sufficient degrees of 
freedom in each individual subsample. Forty subsamples seem to strike this balance well, but we also 
performed the estimations with 30 to 50 subsamples. The results from these estimations suggest similar 
relationships to the ones described here.   
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“high” inflation rates. It is possible that the indexations of financial contracts cannot 
sufficiently reduce the uncertainty about the real value of nominal payments when 
inflation becomes too high. In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) note that 
very high inflation rates reveal a deterioration of institutions other than central banking. 
For example, even efficient legal systems take time to enforce contracts. As Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic argue, while payments can be indexed, borrowers and lenders 
cannot “index judgment.” 
 To recount, the major determinants of the maturity composition of bank credit to 
the private sector are rule of law, inflation, the existence of institutions for credit 
information sharing, and the size of the financial system. These effects are robust across 
various estimation techniques and specifications of the models. They are also robust to 
substituting the rule of law measures with alternative indexes (e.g. the ICRG variables 
and an index of corruption), to different definitions of the credit information sharing 
variable (public vs. private agencies) and to the inclusion of additional control variables 
such as the share of foreign banks and the share of government owned banks (which 
reduce the sample size substantially and are not statistically significant). The next section 
builds on these results to examine the effect of credit maturity on economic growth.   
   
4. Credit Maturity and Economic Growth 
Following the literature, e.g. Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) and Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000), we estimate the growth equations using dynamic panel 
generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) techniques to address the potential endogeneity 
of credit and other explanatory variables. This technique is fully described in Appendix 
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C. The literature usually investigates the effect of finance on growth by averaging data 
over 5 years to reduce the impact of business cycles and to concentrate on long-term 
growth. Proceeding in the same fashion would reduce the number of observations in our 
data set substantially as the sample period for most countries is about 10 years long. 
Fortunately, the literature has dealt with this issue. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) 
investigate the impact of equity market liberalization on economic growth by using 
overlapping data. The five-year averages are constructed as 1990-95, then 1991-96, 1992-
97, and so on producing 6 five-year averages from any 10 years of annual data. While 
this ingenious methodology increases the number of observations, it calls for the 
adjustment of the moving average component in the residuals as introduced by Newey 
and West (1987). Without the adjustment, the standard t-tests lead to a slight over-
rejection (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2001). Although in the panel data context, 
unlike in the single time series, we do not need the weighting matrix for the estimate of 
central term in covariance matrix to be positive semi-definite (Petersen 2007), we follow 
Newey and West (1987) assuming that as the distance between observations goes to 
infinity, the correlation between corresponding residuals approaches zero.11 We adjust the 
dependence for up to five lags (i.e. we set lmax to 5) and estimate correlations only 
between lagged residuals in the same cluster.12 The procedure provides serial-correlation 
and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.13  
                                                 
11 We use a weighting matrix which multiplies the covariance of lag l by ( ) ( )( )1/11 max +−− ll , where lmax 
is the maximum lag order. A weighting matrix with such elements will weigh heaviest the adjacent 
observation, while the weights decrease as the distance between observations increases. 
12 As suggested by several papers, we have repeated the procedure by including up to T-1 lags, where T is 
the maximum number of years per country, but doing so leaves our standard errors almost unchanged. 
13 Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) also use overlapping averages to provide long-term 
predictions of the finance and growth relationship and adjust their standard errors according to Newey and 
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4.1. Results 
Column (1) in Table 6 reports the results of an equation where economic growth 
is explained by private sector credit, initial GDP per capita, government size, openness to 
trade, and inflation. This is a standard specification from the finance and growth literature 
(Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). Financial development is expected to lead to faster 
economic growth. High inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability and is 
expected to slow down economic growth. More open economies are expected to grow 
faster. A large government size is taken as an indicator of inefficient use of resources and 
is expected to reduce economic growth. Initial income is included to test for income 
convergence.14 
The results show that private credit has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on economic growth. Besides being statistically significant, private credit also has 
a large economic effect, similar to the effect reported in the previous literature. To 
illustrate, we compare our results with the estimates of Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000): 
a 10 percent exogenous increase in private credit leads to an additional 0.216 percentage 
points of economic growth per year using our estimated coefficient,15 and to 0.228 
percentage point of additional yearly growth using the estimated coefficient of Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza (2000). The coefficients on all control variables except government 
size have the expected signs. Openness to trade and initial income per capita are 
                                                                                                                                                 
West (1987). Petersen (2007) finds that about 7 percent of authors who use panel data in the finance 
literature adjust their standard errors using the Newey-West procedure. 
14 We could not obtain recent data on education levels for many countries for the later years in our sample. 
We carried out all estimations with a smaller sample including education and obtained qualitatively similar, 
but less statistically significant results on all variables. 
15 The calculation is as performed follows: 2.296 * ln(1.1) = 0.216. 
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statistically significant at the accepted confidence levels. The specification tests confirm 
the validity of our results: we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan tests or of 
the serial-correlation test at the accepted confidence levels in all specifications. 
In column (2) we add the percent long-term credit. Credit maturity has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on economic growth as predicted by Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991). In terms of economic size a 10 percent increase in the portion of long-term 
credit leads to an additional 0.574 percentage points of economic growth per year.16 As 
the average growth rate in the sample is 2.98 percent, the impact of an increase in credit 
maturity on growth is large (an increase of over 19 percent).  
Consider the following example to illustrate the economic impact of credit 
maturity. Private credit in Malaysia is 130 percent of GDP which is well above the 
average of the middle income group: 58.31 percent. By this standard measure Malaysia 
has above average financial development. However, only 46.73  percent of private credit 
in Malaysia is long-term, which is below the average of the middle income group of 
63.17 percent. Thus, Malaysian banks extend relatively large volumes of credit but much 
of the credit is short-term compared to other countries. If private credit in Malaysia 
declined to the average of the middle income group, economic growth in Malaysia would 
decline by 1.616 percentage points. However, if the percent long-term credit in Malaysia 
increased to the average of the middle income group, economic growth would increase by 
1.815 percentage points. If these two changes happened simultaneously, economic 
growth in Malaysia would increase by 0.199 percentage points. Therefore, if most of the 
                                                 
16 The calculation is as follows: 6.02 * ln(1.1) = 0.574; where 6.02 is the coefficient of the percent long-
term credit in column (2). 
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reduction in credit originated from a decline in short-term credits, the negative impact of 
reduced credit to the private sector would be countered by the longer maturity of credit.17 
 
4.2.  The determinants of credit maturity and economic growth. 
Section 3 shows that credit maturity is longer in countries that have strong 
institutions, low inflation, and institutions for sharing credit information among financial 
institutions. These characteristics also influence economic growth through their impact 
on credit maturity. Furthermore, the impact is large. Using the estimations in column (2) 
in Table 5, we obtained the predicted values for the percent long-term credit. Then, we 
reestimated the growth equation using the predicted values for the percent long-term 
credit. These results are reported in column (3) of Table 6.  
Putting together the estimates from sections 3 and 4, we estimate that an increase 
in the rule of law index by 1 index point would increase economic growth (via credit 
maturity) by 0.586 percentage points a year.18 A decrease of inflation by 10 percentage 
points leads to a 0.045 percentage points faster economic growth.19 The establishment of 
a credit information sharing institution in a country would raise economic growth by 
                                                 
17 For robustness, we also added the stock market value traded as a share of GDP, the stock market turnover 
ratio, and stock market capitalization as a share of GDP as measures of stock market development. The 
stock market is an alternative source of long-term financing and its inclusion in the model might reduce the 
effect of credit maturity on economic growth. Although the sample size decreases from 64 to 44 countries, 
the coefficient on credit maturity remains statistically significant and similar in magnitude. All stock 
market measures have positive coefficients, while only value traded and the turnover ratio are statistically 
significant. 
18 1.00 increase in rule of law leads to (5.308 * 1.00 =) 5.31 percentage points increase in the percent long-
term credit. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly GDP 
growth of (6.27 * (ln(0.541+ 0.053) - ln(0.541))=) 0.586 percentage points. 
19 0.10 decrease in inflation leads to (3.939 * 0.10 =) 0.394 percentage points increase in the percent long-
term credit. At the sample average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly 
GDP growth of (6.27 * (ln(0.5414 + 0.00394) – ln(0.5414)) =) 0.045 percentage points. Note that this 
calculation is separate from the independent impact of inflation on growth. Such decrease in inflation 
independently increases growth by 0.82 percentage points.  
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0.718 percentage points.20 These effects on economic growth via credit maturity are 
separate from other channels through which strong institutions, low inflation and 
institutions for credit information sharing might affect growth.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates empirically one of the important functions of the banking 
system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial assets that 
can fund long gestation activities and enhance economic growth. The paper shows that 
the extent to which banks perform this function well has an important effect on the 
relationship between the financial system and economic growth. Economic growth is 
faster in countries where the banking system extends more long-term credits.  
Furthermore, the paper shows that credit maturity depends on a number of 
institutional and economic factors. Greater rule of law, low inflation, and credit 
information sharing institutions contribute to lengthening the maturity of bank credit. 
While policymakers can make improvements along each of these dimensions, the effect 
of credit information sharing is probably most interesting form a policy perspective. 
Improvements in the rule of law and sustained low inflation take decades, whereas a 
credit information sharing institution can be established within a few years. We show that 
these institutions provide valuable information to banks and are associated with longer 
maturity of credit. This, in turn, raises economic growth.  
In a parallel paper where we use a smaller data set primarily from the transition 
economies, we show that the rule of law has greater effect on the portion of credit with 
                                                 
20The establishment of a credit information sharing institution would increase the percent long-term credit 
by 6.573 percentage points. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in 
yearly GDP growth of (6.27*(ln(0.7604+0.06573)-ln(0.7604)=) 0.718 percentage points. 
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maturity longer than five years, whereas inflation has a greater effect on the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than one year. In addition, per capita GDP becomes 
significant determinant of maturity, as it has a positive impact of the portion of credit 
with maturity longer than five years. Credit information sharing institutions remain 
important determinant of maturity.  
To our knowledge, the results presented in this paper are the first empirical test of 
an important theoretical idea – that banks contribute to economic growth by providing 
liquidity services and increasing the supply of long-term credit. Future work can examine 
additional channels through which finance enhances economic growth: by producing 
information about borrowers and allocating capital, by monitoring borrowers, by 
aggregating savings into large-size investments, and by cross sectional risk 
diversification. Ideally, we would be able to compare the channels through which finance 
affects growth in various institutional and economic environments. We would also be 
able to investigate whether lax rule of law diminishes the positive effect of finance on the 
economy because banks: 1) cannot assess risk and monitor the behavior of borrowers,  
and/or as we show here, 2) curtail long-term financing. We would also be able to 
investigate how the relative importance of different channels evolves as the financial 
system develops. In summary, investigating the channels through which finance affects 
growth presents a number of exciting research opportunities. 
26 
References 
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: 
Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of 
Economic Studies 58, no. 2: 277-297. 
Arellano, Manuel and Olympia Bover. 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable 
estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68, no. 1: 29-51. 
Barclay, Michael J and Clifford W Smith, Jr. 1995. The maturity structure of corporate 
debt. Journal of Finance 50, no. 2: 609-631. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross Levine. 2000. A new database on 
financial development and structure. World Bank Economic Review 14, no. 3: 
597-605. 
Beck, Thorsten and Ross Levine. 2004. Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel 
evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 28, no. 3: 423-442. 
Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine, and Norman Loayza. 2000. Finance and the sources of 
growth. Journal of Financial Economics 58, no. 1-2: 261-300. 
Bekaert, Geert, Campbell R. Harvey, and Christian Lundblad. 2001. Emerging equity 
markets and economic development. Journal of Development Economics 66, no. 
2: 465-504. 
________. 2005. Does financial liberalization spur growth? Journal of Financial 
Economics 77, no. 1: 3-55. 
Bencivenga, Valerie R. and Bruce D. Smith. 1991. Financial intermediation and 
endogenous growth. Review of Economic Studies 58, no. 2: 195-209. 
Blundell, Richard and Stephen Bond. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in 
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, no. 1: 115-143. 
Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen von. 1891. Positive theory of capital. Translated by William 
Smart. London: Macmillan. 
Booth, Laurence, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. 2001. Capital 
structures in developing countries. Journal of Finance 56, no. 1: 87-130. 
Boyd, John H., Ross Levine, and Bruce D. Smith. 2001. The impact of inflation on 
financial sector performance. Journal of Monetary Economics 47, no. 2: 221-248. 
Brown, Martin, Tullio Jappelli, and Marco Pagano. 2007. Information sharing and credit: 
Firm-level evidence from transition countries: C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, CEPR 
Discussion Papers: 6313. 
27 
Calderon, Cesar Augusto, Alberto Chong, and Norman V. Loayza. 2002. Determinants of 
current account deficits in developing countries. Contributions to 
Macroeconomics 2, no. 1: na. 
Cameron, Rondo E. 1967. Banking in the early stages of industrialization; a study in 
comparative economic history. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cetorelli, Nicola and Michele Gambera. 2001. Banking market structure, financial 
dependence and growth: International evidence from industry data. Journal of 
Finance 56, no. 2: 617-648. 
Choi, Sangmok, Bruce D. Smith, and John H. Boyd. 1996. Inflation, financial markets, 
and capital formation. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 78, no. 3: 9-35. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic. 1999. Institutions, financial markets, and 
firm debt maturity. Journal of Financial Economics 54, no. 3: 295-336. 
Diamond, Douglas W. 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review 
of Economic Studies 51, no. 3: 393-414. 
________. 1991. Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, no. 3: 709-737. 
________. 1993. Seniority and maturity of debt contracts. Journal of Financial 
Economics 33, no. 3: 341-368. 
________. 1997. Liquidity, banks, and markets. Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 5: 
928-956. 
________. 2004. Presidential address, committing to commit: Short-term debt when 
enforcement is costly. Journal of Finance 59, no. 4: 1447-1479. 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and 
liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3: 401-419. 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Raghuram G. Rajan. 2000. A theory of bank capital. Journal 
of Finance 55, no. 6: 2431-2465. 
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer. 2007. Private credit in 129 
countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, no. 2: 299-329. 
Flannery, Mark J. 1986. Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. Journal 
of Finance 41, no. 1: 19-37. 
Giannetti, Mariassunta. 2003. Do better institutions mitigate agency problems? Evidence 
from corporate finance choices. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
38, no. 1: 185-212. 
28 
Grossman, Sanford J. 1976. On the efficiency of competitive stock markets where trades 
have diverse information. Journal of Finance 31, no. 2: 573-585. 
Grossman, Sanford J. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1980. On the impossibility of 
informationally efficient markets. American Economic Review 70, no. 3: 393-408. 
Haslag, Joseph H. and Jahyeong Koo. 1999. Financial repression, financial development 
and economic growth: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Papers: 99-02. 
Hausman, Jerry A. and William E. Taylor. 1981. Panel data and unobservable individual 
effects. Econometrica 49, no. 6: 1377-1398. 
Hicks, John Richard. 1969. A theory of economic history. Oxford: Clarendon P. 
Huybens, Elisabeth and Bruce D. Smith. 1998. Financial market frictions, monetary 
policy, and capital accumulation in a small open economy. Journal of Economic 
Theory 81, no. 2: 353-400. 
________. 1999. Inflation, financial markets and long-run real activity. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 43, no. 2: 283-315. 
Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano. 2002. Information sharing, lending and defaults: 
Cross-country evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 26, no. 10: 2017-2045. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. Governance matters VI: 
Aggregate and individual governance indicators for 1996-2006: The World Bank, 
Policy Research Working Paper Series: 4280. 
Khan, Mohsin S. and Abdelhak S. Senhadji. 2000. Threshold effects in the relationship 
between inflation and growth: International Monetary Fund, IMF Working 
Papers: 00/110. 
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott. 1982. Time to build and aggregate 
fluctuations. Econometrica 50, no. 6: 1345-1370. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 
1997. Legal determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52, no. 3: 1131-
1150. 
________. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 6: 1113-1155. 
Levine, Ross. 1997. Financial development and growth. Views and agenda. Journal of 
Economic Literature 35 no. 2: 688-726. 
________. 2005. Finance and growth: Theory and evidence. In Handbook of economic 
growth, ed. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf. Amsterdam: North-Holland Elsevier 
Publishers. 
29 
Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten Beck. 2000. Financial intermediation and 
growth: Causality and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics 46, no. 1: 31-77. 
Loayza, Norman, Alberto Chong, and Cesar Calderon. 1999. Determinants of current 
account deficits in developing countries: The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series: 2398. 
Mayer, Colin. 1988. New issues in corporate finance. European Economic Review 32, no. 
5: 1167-1183. 
Mayer, Colin and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1990. Financial systems, corporate finance, and 
economic development. In Asymmetric information, corporate finance, and 
investment:307-332. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 
Miller, Margaret J. 2003. Credit reporting systems around the globe: The state of the art 
in public credit registries and private credit reporting firms. In Credit reporting 
systems and the international economy:25-79: Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press. 
Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller. 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance 
and the theory of investment. American Economic Review 48, no. 3: 261-297. 
Morris, James R. 1976. On corporate debt maturity strategies. Journal of Finance 31, no. 
1: 29-37. 
Newey, Whitney K. and Kenneth D. West. 1987. A simple, positive semi-definite, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. 
Econometrica 55, no. 3: 703-708. 
Padilla, A. Jorge and Marco Pagano. 2000. Sharing default information as a borrower 
discipline device. European Economic Review 44, no. 10: 1951-1980. 
Pagano, Marco. 1993. Financial markets and growth: An overview. European Economic 
Review 37, no. 2-3: 613-622. 
Pagano, Marco and Tullio Jappelli. 1993. Information sharing in credit markets. Journal 
of Finance 48, no. 5: 1693-1718. 
Papke, Leslie E. and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 1996. Econometric methods for fractional 
response variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics 11, no. 6: 619-632. 
Petersen, M. A.  and R. G. Rajan. 1995. The effect of credit market competition on 
lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 2: 407-443. 
Petersen, Mitchell A. 2007. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: 
Comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies: forthcoming. 
30 
Qian, Jun and Philip E. Strahan. 2007. How laws and institutions shape financial 
contracts: The case of bank loans. Journal of Finance 62, no. 6: 2803-2834. 
Rajan, Raghuram G. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and 
arm's-length debt. Journal of Finance 47, no. 4: 1367-1400. 
Ranciere, Romaine, Aaron Tornell, and Frank Westermann. 2003. Crises and growth: A 
re-evaluation: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working 
Papers: 10073. 
Ravid, S. Abraham. 1996. Debt maturity--a survey. Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Instruments 5, no. 3: 1-69. 
Rodrik, Dani and Andres Velasco. 1999. Short-term capital flows: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 7364. 
Rousseau, Peter L. and Paul Wachtel. 2002. Inflation thresholds and the finance-growth 
nexus. Journal of International Money and Finance 21, no. 6: 777-793. 
Scherr, Frederick C. and Heather M. Hulburt. 2001. The debt maturity structure of small 
firms. Financial Management 30, no. 1: 85 - 111. 
Sissoko, Carolyn. 2006. Short-term credit: A monetary channel linking finance to growth: 
Occidental College (Department of Economics), mimeo. 
Smith, Clifford W., Jr. and Ross L. Watts. 1992. The investment opportunity set and 
corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial 
Economics 32, no. 3: 263-292. 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1974. On the irrelevance of corporate financial policy. American 
Economic Review 64, no. 6: 851-866. 
Stohs, Mark Hoven and David C. Mauer. 1996. The determinants of corporate debt 
maturity structure. Journal of Business 69, no. 3: 279-312. 
Titman, Sheridan. 1992. Interest rate swaps and corporate financing choices. Journal of 
Finance 47, no. 4: 1503-1516. 
Valev, Neven T. 2006. Institutional uncertainty and the maturity of international loans. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 25, no. 5: 780-794. 
________. 2007. Uncertainty and international debt maturity. Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 17, no. 4: 372-386. 
Zhang, Chendi and Marco Sorge. 2007. Credit information quality and corporate debt 
maturity: Theory and evidence: The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
Series: 4239. 
 
31 
Appendix A. List of Countries 
Below is the list of countries used in the estimations.  
Albania Gabon  Nicaragua  
Armenia  Georgia  Niger  
Austria  Germany  Norway  
Azerbaijan  Greece  Poland  
Bahamas, The Guinea Bissau Portugal  
Bangladesh Hungary  Romania  
Belgium  Iceland  Russia  
Benin  Ireland  Saudi Arabia  
Bolivia  Italy  Senegal  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Ivory Coast  Serbia, Republic of 
Bulgaria  Jordan  Singapore 
Burkina Kazakhstan  Slovak Republic  
Cameroon  Kyrgyz Republic  Slovenia  
Central African Republic  Latvia  Spain  
Chad  Lesotho  Sri Lanka  
China  Lithuania  Sweden  
Congo  Luxembourg  Taiwan 
Cyprus  Macau  Togo  
Czech Republic  Macedonia, FYR Tunisia  
Denmark Malaysia  Turkey 
Equatorial Guinea Mali  Ukraine  
Estonia  Mongolia  United States  
Finland Mozambique  Uruguay  
France  Netherlands, The Yemen  
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Appendix B. Determinants of Credit Maturity – Additional Estimators 
 Fixed Effects GLS GLS – AR(1)  2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Rule of Law 5.607 4.431 6.407 16.879 5.061 5.173 3.008 5.291
(0.196) (0.515) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.317) (0.152)
Inflation  -3.985 -9.321 -3.034 -27.937 -1.600 -6.242 -3.892 -10.247
(0.014) (0.360) (0.092) (0.000) (0.025) (0.323) (0.000) (0.126)
Growth 0.268 0.249 0.433 0.527 0.027 0.251 0.257 0.362
(0.351) (0.248) (0.003) (0.001) (0.762) (0.038) (0.119) (0.109)
Credit 10.615 14.280 11.748 9.896 10.758 14.238 15.575 14.463
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 0.684 0.457 -0.073 -0.352 0.200 0.050 -0.158 -0.210
(0.066) (0.268) (0.429) (0.001) (0.104) (0.729) (0.533) (0.437)
Credit Information 
Sharing 
6.129 4.072 4.060 5.155
(0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.017)
Banking Industry 
Concentration 
4.622 4.147 2.907 4.727
(0.427) (0.009) (0.080) (0.181)
Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio 
0.044 0.492 1.152 -0.085
(0.951) (0.299) (0.022) (0.905)
Output Volatility -0.864 5.362 0.777 0.382
(0.545) (0.000) (0.441) (0.837)
Manufacturing Share 
of Output 
-0.788 -0.544 -0.581 -0.647
(0.082) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022)
U.K. Legal Origin -8.452 -15.347 -10.670 -11.068 
(0.038) (0.001) (0.022) (0.032) 
French Legal Origin -5.440 -10.414 -6.992 -8.857 
(0.162) (0.016) (0.111) (0.051) 
German Legal Origin -0.223 -2.672 -1.164 2.929 
(0.955) (0.557) (0.788) (0.514) 
Socialist Legal Origin 9.951 13.151 10.342 15.960 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.027) (0.002) 
Constant 58.801 77.625 65.613 65.258 64.472 74.863 71.521 78.519
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman test:          χ2 
(d.f.) 
7.48
(5)
183.81
(10)
8.69
(5)
33.67 
(10) 
19.22
(5)
9.43
(10)
p-value 0.187 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.001 0.492
Observations 504 284 504 284 504 281 504 284
Countries 71 45 71 45 71 42 71 45
Notes:  See Table 1 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. In 2SLS, legal origin dummies are used as instruments for endogenous credit. 
Hausman test has a null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the 
country-specific random-effects. Credit, Banking Industry Concentration, Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio, and Output Volatility enter the regression as log(variable), while Income is in thousands. 
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Appendix C. GMM Methodology21 
Let yit be the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t. We are 
interested in the following equation:  
(1) tiititititi Xyyy ,,1,1,, )1( εηβα ++′+−=− −−  
where yi,t - yi,t-1 is the growth rate in real per capita GDP, Xi,t is a set of explanatory 
variables, including our measures for financial development, iη  captures unobserved 
country-specific effects, and itε  is an error term. We rewrite equation (1) as: 
(2)  ,,,1,, tiitititi Xyy εηβα ++′+= −  
and take first differences to eliminate the country-specific effect, as it is correlated with 
lagged dependent variable: 
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )1,,1,,2,1,1,, −−−−− −+−′+−=− titititititititi XXyyyy εεβα . 
By construction, in equation (3), the lagged difference in per capita GDP is 
correlated with the error term, which along with the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables X, requires the use of instruments. The GMM difference estimator 
uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments under the conditions 
that the error term is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous (i.e., they are uncorrelated with future error terms). Then 
the following moment conditions are used to calculate the difference estimator: 
(4) ( ), , , 1 0 for 2; 3,...., ,i t s i t i tE y s t Tε ε− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ =⎣ ⎦  
(5) ( ), , , 1 0 for 2; 3,...., .i t s i t i tE X s t Tε ε− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ =⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
21 This method is fully described in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell 
and Bond (1998).  
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Since persistence in the explanatory variables may adversely affect the small-
sample and asymptotic properties of the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998), 
the difference estimator is further combined with an estimator in levels to produce a 
system estimator. The inclusion of a levels equation also allows us to use information on 
cross-country differences, which is not possible with the difference estimator alone.  
The equation in levels uses the lagged differences of the explanatory variables as 
instruments under two conditions. First, the error term is not serially correlated. Second, 
although there may be correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables and the 
case-specific error term, there is no correlation between the difference in the explanatory 
variables and the error term. This yields the following stationarity properties: 
(6) , , , ,andi t p i i t q i i t p i i t q iE y E y E X E Xη η η η+ + + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦     for all p and q.   
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are:  
(7) ( )( ), , 1 , 0 for 1i t s i t s i i tE y y sη ε− − −⎡ ⎤− + = =⎣ ⎦  
(8) ( )( ), , 1 , 0 for 1i t s i t s i i tE X X sη ε− − −⎡ ⎤− + = =⎣ ⎦ .  
In summary, the GMM system estimator is obtained using the moment conditions 
in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8). In addition, as Beck and Levine (2004), we use 
alternative procedure developed by Calderon, Chong, and Loayza (2002) and Loayza, 
Chong, and Calerdon (1999) to control for the over-fitting by reducing the dimensionality 
of instruments. This procedure has one shortcoming: in order to perform it we loose one 
time period from the sample. Nevertheless, given the sample size, we are still able to 
make robust estimates. 
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As our data are constructed using overlapping averages, we need to adjust the 
moving average component in the residuals. We do this by adjusting standard errors 
according to Newey-West  (1987) procedure, modified for the use in panel data. Petersen 
(2007) points that, unlike for the single time series, in the panel data context the 
weighting matrix is not necessary for the estimate of central term in covariance matrix to 
be positive semi-definite. Nevertheless, we follow Newey-West approach assuming that 
as the distance between observations goes to infinity, the correlation between residuals 
approaches zero. Therefore, we use a weighting matrix which multiplies the covariance 
of lag l by ( ) ( )( )max1 1 1l l− − + , where lmax is the maximum lag order. Weighting matrix 
with such elements will weigh heaviest the adjacent observation, while the weights 
decrease as distance between observations increases. We adjust the dependence for up to 
five lags (i.e. we set lmax to 5) and estimate correlations only between lagged residuals in 
the same cluster. As suggested by several papers, we have repeated the procedure by 
including up to T-1 lags, where T is the maximum number of years per country, but doing 
so leaves our standard errors almost unchanged. This procedure provides serial-
correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
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Figure 1: Credit Information Sharing Institutions and Credit Maturity 
Plotted are the averages of the percent long-term credit for the period before and after the 
establishment of credit information sharing institutions. The years included vary by country 
depending on data availability. For The Czech Republic each period includes 5 years; for Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, and Republic of Serbia 4 years; for Bulgaria and China 3 years; for FRY 
Macedonia 2 years; and for Norway 1 year. 
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Figure 2: Impact of Inflation on Credit Maturity at Different Inflation Levels 
Plotted are the estimated coefficients of inflation and 95 percent confidence intervals when we 
use subsamples ordered by inflation. Each subsample contains 244 observations. The values on 
the abscissa correspond to the subsamples used in the estimations, while values on the ordinate 
represent the coefficient (and confidence intervals) estimates of inflation for the corresponding 
subsample.  
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Sources 
Credit / GDP Credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions to the private 
sector divided by GDP. 
Central Bank of West African States: 
Benin, Burkina, Guinea Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo; Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa: 
Cameroon, Central African R., Chad, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon; 
Eurostat: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech R.*, Denmark, Finland, 
France*, Greece*, the Netherlands*, 
Norway, Poland*, Spain, and 
Sweden; and FDIC Statistics on 
Depository Institutions for the United 
States. For the remaining countries 
(and as second source for countries 
with * above) source was 
corresponding central bank (official 
publications and website). 
Long-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Long-Term Credit is credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector with the 
original contractual maturity longer 
than one year divided by GDP. 
Short-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Short-Term Credit is credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector with the 
original contractual maturity of one 
year or less divided by GDP. 
Percent Long-
Term Credit 
Credit with an original contractual 
maturity longer than one year divided 
by credit. 
Real per capita 
GDP Growth 
The percent increase in real per capita 
GDP from the previous year. 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). In some cases data were 
retrieved from Eurostat database and 
Euromonitor International's World 
Marketing Data and Statistics (Plus) 
which uses IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook, United Nations, as well as 
national statistics in addition to IFS. 
Per Capita GDP  The real per capita GDP in US dollars. 
Inflation The increase in the annual CPI. 
Trade / GDP Sum of imports and exports of goods 
and services as a share of GDP. 
Gov. / GDP General government consumption as 
share of GDP. 
Rule of Law Index that measures “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement.” 
World Bank data set Governance 
Matters VI  by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007). 
Banking 
Industry Conc. 
The assets of three largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks. World Bank data set A new database 
on financial development and 
structure by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine (2000). 
Stock Market 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Stock market volume traded during a 
year divided by the stock market 
capitalization at the end of the year. 
Credit Info. 
Sharing 
Dummy variable: 1 if public credit 
registry or private credit bureau 
operates in a country during a year, 0 
otherwise. 
Author constructed from Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), Miller 
(2003), and Pagano, Brown, and 
Japelli (2007). 
Manuf. Share of 
Output 
Value added by manufacturing divided 
by total value added. 
United Nations’ National Accounts 
Main Aggregates Database. 
Output Volatility Root mean squared errors from Growtht 
= α + εt, using data from the preceding 
10 years. 
Author constructed from data on Real 
per capita GDP Growth. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
  Real per 
capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Credit / 
GDP 
Percent 
Long-
Term 
Credit 
Per 
Capita 
GDP  Inflation
Gov. / 
GDP 
Trade / 
GDP 
Rule of 
Law 
Banking 
Industry 
Conc. 
Stock 
Market 
Turnover 
Ratio 
Credit 
Info. 
Sharing
Output 
Volatility
Manuf. 
Share of 
Output 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean 2.98 53.04 54.14 9,676 11.82 16.55 90.67 0.33 0.72 0.63 0.64 4.32 4.32
Maximum 13.69 206.61 99.32 52,228 1,058.37 30.68 321.7 2.12 1 16.02 1 21.78 21.78
Minimum -12.81 0 1.51 82 -9.62 3.91 23.33 -1.94 0.24 0 0 0.56 0.56
Std. Dev. 3.8 44.7 24.35 10,943 55.24 5.47 44.76 1.05 0.2 1.06 0.48 3.73 3.73
Observations 659 659 659 659 652 653 637 510 528 403 659 554 554
Panel B: Correlations 
Growth 1.00*     
Credit / GDP -0.07* 1.00*    
Percent Long-
Term Credit 
0.13* 0.57* 1.00*    
Per Capita GDP -0.08* 0.61* 0.45* 1.00*    
Inflation -0.25* -0.12* -0.16* -0.13* 1.00*    
Gov. / GDP -0.04* 0.32* 0.32* 0.37* -0.06* 1.00*    
Trade / GDP 0.16* 0.20* 0.18* 0.17* -0.03* 0.05* 1.00*   
Rule of Law -0.10* 0.72* 0.61* 0.85* -0.13* 0.50* 0.25* 1.00*   
Bank. Ind. Conc. -0.12* -0.05* -0.02* -0.10* 0.05* 0.08* -0.10* 0.00* 1.00*   
Stock Mkt. TOR -0.08* 0.07* 0.04* 0.09* -0.09* 0.11* -0.13* 0.05* 0.03* 1.00*   
Credit Info. 
Sharing 
-0.04* 0.17* 0.09* 0.11* -0.17* 0.07* -0.20* 0.20* -0.06* 0.14* 1.00*   
Output Volatility 0.25* -0.46* -0.32* -0.41* 0.07* -0.28* 0.11* -0.52* 0.03* -0.14* -0.38* 1.00*  
Manuf. Share of 
Output 
0.10* 0.31* 0.26* 0.11* 0.02* 0.12* 0.20* 0.35* -0.15* 0.04* -0.02* -0.00* 1.00*
Notes: * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 3: Country Averages (Credit and Credit Maturity) 
Country 
Credit / 
GDP 
Long-
Term 
Credit / 
GDP 
Short- 
Term 
Credit 
/ GDP
Percent 
Long- 
Term 
Credit Country 
Credit / 
GDP 
Long-
Term 
Credit / 
GDP 
Short- 
Term 
Credit 
/ GDP 
Percent 
Long- 
Term 
Credit Country 
Credit / 
GDP 
Long-
Term 
Credit / 
GDP 
Short- 
Term 
Credit 
/GDP
Percent 
Long- 
Term 
Credit
Albania 5.72 2.99 2.73 45.79 Georgia  8.16 3.73 4.44 35.08 Norway  77.45 66.99 10.45 86.44
Armenia  34.47 21.86 12.61 63.41 Germany  95.36 79.18 16.18 82.82 Poland  15.32 9.09 6.23 59.41
Austria  115.33 86.88 28.45 75.28 Greece  49.15 24.83 24.33 49.18 Portugal  126.82 91.98 34.84 69.32
Azerbaijan  0.08 0.02 0.06 25.44 Guinea Bissau 2.22 0.38 1.84 14.21 Romania  16.48 5.99 10.49 34.9
Bahamas, The 69.18 62.74 6.44 90.6 Hungary  72.23 54.87 17.36 75.41 Russia  14.22 6.51 7.7 47.59
Bangladesh 38.98 5.47 33.5 14.01 Iceland  92.66 31.92 60.75 35.28 Saudi Arabia 29.46 10.09 19.37 33.12
Belgium  101.5 67.62 33.88 66.86 Ireland  119.13 93.2 25.93 77.41 Senegal  19.69 7.26 12.43 37
Benin  13.4 3.94 9.46 29.36 Italy  73.88 39.29 34.59 52.66 Serbia, Rep. 56.97 14.86 42.11 31.44
Bolivia  36.84 27.12 9.72 73.77 Ivory Coast  14.01 3.52 10.49 25.1 Singapore 66.34 41.59 24.75 60.9
Bosnia&Herzegov. 39.75 28.98 10.77 72.56 Jordan  79.9 27.23 52.67 33.74 Slovak Rep. 25.76 17.36 8.39 67.26
Bulgaria  19.13 14 5.12 68.09 Kazakhstan  16.3 9.84 6.46 49.13 Slovenia  28.02 17.02 11 59.68
Burkina 13.55 4.14 9.41 30.39 Kyrgyz Rep. 2.31 0.34 1.97 13.9 Spain  91.64 71.33 20.31 77.31
Cameroon  10.27 2.91 7.36 28.31 Latvia  28.44 21.68 6.77 65.21 Sri Lanka  25.07 10.11 14.96 40.2
Cent. African Rep. 6.88 0.59 6.29 8.76 Lesotho  8.28 2.29 5.99 21.76 Sweden  112.06 109.18 2.88 97.45
Chad  5.82 0.62 5.2 11.45 Lithuania  17.95 11.66 6.29 58.21 Taiwan 143.59 99.66 43.93 69.37
China  106.76 38.89 67.87 36.24 Luxembourg 97.36 58.24 39.12 59.87 Togo  14.97 6.13 8.83 41.47
Congo  11.11 1.13 9.98 21.4 Macau  65.17 39.89 25.28 61.77 Tunisia  65.34 30.35 34.99 46.35
Cyprus  199.09 184.72 14.37 92.77 Macedonia 13.03 6.56 6.47 46.36 Turkey 57.23 52.59 4.64 91.62
Czech Republic  49.27 31.4 17.86 65.02 Malaysia  126.31 60.04 66.27 47.83 Ukraine  7.07 3.72 3.35 27.36
Denmark 23.54 10.03 13.51 40.98 Mali  19.23 4.67 14.55 24.24 United States 62.24 27.58 34.66 44.01
Equatorial Guinea 2.78 0.58 2.2 21.42 Mongolia  23.7 5.39 18.31 20.65 Uruguay  58.8 32.16 26.64 52.16
Estonia  41.37 36 5.37 82.52 Mozambique 14.19 6.12 8.07 44.05 Yemen  5.08 0.28 4.81 5.53
Finland 81.66 74.34 7.32 91.05 Netherlands 134.8 100.64 34.16 74.37  
France  86.22 72.98 13.24 84.64 Nicaragua  24.04 12.92 11.12 53.81 Sample 53.04 34.88 18.16 54.14
Gabon  12.41 5.41 7.01 43.66 Niger  5.95 1.42 4.54 23.26  
Notes: Presented are country averages for the available years. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 4: Income and Bank Credit Maturity 
  
Real per 
capita GDP 
Growth Credit / GDP
Long-Term 
Credit / 
GDP 
Short-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Percent 
Long-Term 
Credit 
Low income countries 2.64 25.01 12.08 12.93 40.38
Middle income countries 3.04 58.31 39.91 18.40 63.17
High income countries 2.20 93.81 69.16 24.65 72.39
Notes: Presented are the average values for each variable for three income groups defined as low 
income if per capita GDP is below $1,715, middle income if it is between $1,715 and $10,800, 
and as high income if it is above $10,800. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 5: The Determinants of Credit Maturity (Hausman-Taylor Estimation) 
The dependent variable is credit with an original contractual maturity longer than one year 
divided by overall credit. The explanatory variables are defined as in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rule of Law 5.308 5.041 4.490 6.925 4.197 8.331 6.857
(0.035) (0.043) (0.145) (0.044) (0.105) (0.003) (0.047)
Inflation  -3.939 -3.364 -2.455 -12.418 -2.848 -3.861 -11.418
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (0.000) (0.070)
Growth 0.266 0.220 0.138 -0.045 0.137 0.261 0.194
(0.081) (0.148) (0.424) (0.823) (0.369) (0.099) (0.334)
Credit 11.006 10.443 11.291 14.962 13.465 11.516 15.098
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income 0.311 0.362 0.698 0.270 0.148 0.109 0.334
(0.248) (0.175) (0.029) (0.388) (0.580) (0.711) (0.300)
Credit Information 
Sharing 
6.940 6.573
(0.001) (0.001)
Banking Industry 
Concentration 
1.504 5.092
(0.632) (0.140)
Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio 
-0.952 0.142
(0.168) (0.832)
Output Volatility -0.678 0.003
(0.595) (0.999)
Manufacturing Share of 
Output 
-1.010 -0.611
(0.000) (0.038)
U.K. Legal Origin 5.141 7.888 12.948 -2.505 -1.218 0.506 -0.281
(0.658) (0.495) (0.366) (0.844) (0.915) (0.969) (0.983)
French Legal Origin 9.606 10.718 15.879 1.866 3.427 4.217 3.905
(0.400) (0.345) (0.256) (0.877) (0.762) (0.740) (0.746)
German Legal Origin 11.818 12.313 15.010 6.453 8.347 14.710 10.642
(0.394) (0.375) (0.379) (0.660) (0.581) (0.360) (0.491)
Socialist Legal Origin 23.087 26.770 32.466 26.432 16.725 24.301 32.692
(0.055) (0.026) (0.029) (0.056) (0.161) (0.068) (0.017)
Constant 48.685 40.788 39.351 52.309 59.692 67.446 55.856
(0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman test:       χ2 (d.f.) 6.41 (5) 5.43 (6) 8.83 (6) 4.87 (6) 3.46 (6) 2.09 (6) 0.88 (10)
p-value 0.268 0.490 0.183 0.561 0.749 0.911 0.909
Observations 504 504 419 322 483 418 284
Countries 71 71 67 48 68 65 45
Notes: The results are based on the Hausman-Taylor estimation where Credit is endogenous. P-
values are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The Hausman test has a null hypothesis 
that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
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Table 6: Bank Credit Maturity and Economic Growth (GMM System Estimation, 5-year 
Averages) 
The dependent variable is the average yearly increase in real per capita GDP. The variables are 
defined as in Table 1. Credit, Percent Long-Term Credit, Government size, Openness to trade, 
and Initial income per capita enter the regression as log(variable). Inflation enters the regression 
as log(1 + Inflation). 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Credit 2.296 2.015 2.469
(0.031) (0.095) (0.016)
Percent Long-Term Credit  6.020 6.267
 (0.001) (0.100)
Initial income per capita -2.164 -2.555 -4.747
(0.031) (0.012) (0.000)
Government size 0.709 1.698 0.178
(0.800) (0.545) (0.940)
Openness to trade 17.751 15.090 12.699
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -2.607 -0.645 -8.647
(0.173) (0.761) (0.000)
Constant 44.624 -34.207 -68.554
(0.424) (0.016) (0.000)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.204 0.263 0.962
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.639 0.207 0.103
Observations 499 499 361
Countries 64 64 62
Notes: P-values based on the Newey-West adjusted heteroscedastic-serial consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. The Sargan test has the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals. The serial correlation test has a null 
hypothesis that the errors in the first difference regressions do not exhibit second order serial 
correlation. 
 
